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Abstract 
This paper addresses the problem of creating a human-centered computer-based 
support environment to facilitate innovation and creative work.  It focuses on key 
factors to be considered in the design and development of any such user support 
environment regardless of the specific domain for which it may be implemented.  The 
paper reviews psychological literature on how creativity, insight and innovation occur 
and how they can be fostered in working environments.   Based on this discussion the 
paper then describes a generic set of user or functional requirements intended to apply 
to any domain specific computer-based working environment for support of creative 
activities.  The paper proposes the conceptual model of a Virtual Workbench as a way 
of capturing some of these requirements and as a way of organizing thinking about the 
design of Creative Problem Solving Environments (CPSEs) in general.  Finally, the 
paper proposes one possible translation of the Virtual Workbench and some of the 
functional requirements into a view of a generic model for CPSEs by describing three 
component sets of functions that would be a subset of those needed in almost any 
domain specific CPSE.   
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1.0 Introduction 
This paper addresses the problem of creating a general view of human-centered 
computing support environments for innovation or creative work.  The goal is to 
describe characteristics of such environments that would hold true regardless of 
whether the creative work in question takes place in design, in art, in science, or in 
engineering.  After reviewing psychological literature on how creativity, insight and 
innovation occur and how they can be fostered in working environments, the paper 
describes a set of user requirements for a creativity support environment.  This 
description is intended to be at a level that is general enough to be applied across 
several different domains of creative work.   
 
In addition, the paper proposes the conceptual model of a Virtual Workbench as a way 
capturing some of these user requirements and as a way of thinking about the design, 
development and deployment of Creative Problem Solving Environments (CPSEs).  In 
the Virtual Workbench model, any particular domain specific CPSE would be 
composed of a collection of different tools that can be configured and re-configured as 
needed.  Some of these tools would be generally useful and therefore much the same 
across many different domains of creative endeavor.  Clearly some of the tools would, 
by necessity, be domain specific (e.g., a synthesizer).  However, it is expected that some 
tools that might, at first, appear to be domain specific would actually be conceptually 
similar or applicable in several domains with minor modifications (e.g., a mathematical 
equation solver which can be used to solve chemical equations).  Similarly, some tools 
might appear to be domain specific but have the same functionality in several different 
domains.  For example, it is possible to imagine that both an author and a composer 
might need the electronic equivalent of sticky notes.  The notations used by a composer 
and a choreographer may differ, but the need to capture fragments of thoughts, ideas 
and relationships with minimal disruption of an ongoing activity would be the same. 
 
Finally the paper goes on to propose one possible translation of the Virtual Workbench, 
and some of the embedded user requirements, into a view of a generic model for 
CPSEs.  Specifically, the paper describes three major components of a Virtual 
Workbench that would be domain independent.  These three components are: 1) a 
context sensitive hypertext help and knowledge-base module; 2) a notebook and event 
report module; and 3) a communication support and digital archive module containing 
collaborative communications, event logs, transition logs, auto-archived intermediate 
results of work in progress and any personal “notebook” logs, etc.  While the detailed 
domain content and domain specific tools to be found in a particular CPSE will surely 
differ in some degree across domains of artistic and/or intellectual endeavor, it is 
claimed that the general structure and function of the sample CPSE components 
proposed here, e.g., context sensitive help, will be broadly applicable and will reduce or 
eliminate the barriers to doing creative work in domains where a creative product is a 
initial goal or emerges as a goal during ongoing work. 
 
2.0  Is it possible to support creative activities effectively? 
Before proposing conditions that need to be created in a computer-based environment 
to support creative activities, it is desirable to provide reasons to believe that providing 
such support is actually a reasonable goal.   While it is clearly the case that we can not 
command creative insights or products, there are clear indications in the psychological 
literature that it is possible to create conditions that will improve the possibility of 
creative results, even if only by avoiding conditions that are known to disrupt or to 
work against creativity.  Some of these conditions also illustrate the idea that many of 
the factors are necessary to the production of a creative result even though they are not 
sufficient to guarantee creative results.  For example, in a book based in part on 
extended interview studies conducted with a number of creators of significant 
innovations, Csikszentmihalyi (1996) devotes an entire chapter to discussing the 
implications of his findings for potential enhancement of personal creativity.  Among 
the factors he stresses that can enhance personal creativity is the notion of the 
individual taking and exercising control over his or her own working environment.  
"There should be room for immersion in concentrated activity and for stimulating 
novelty.  The objects around you should help you become what you intend to be (p. 
146)."  However, simply having such control of the working environment is not 
sufficient to guarantee creative output. 
 
Similarly, Shekerjian (1990) interviewed 40 MacArthur Foundation fellows, engaging 
them in a structured discussion about their own creative process.  For those who may 
not be familiar with the MacArthur Foundation fellowship program, the awards are 
made on the basis of a judgment that the awardee has already made, and shows 
significant promise of continuing to make, creative contributions to his or her domain of 
artistic or intellectual endeavor.  The MacArthur Foundation Fellowships have been 
dubbed "the Genius Awards" by the popular press in the United States.  You do not 
apply for a MacArthur fellowship and nobody outside the Foundation knows who the 
nominating committee members are.  The awards typically provide several thousand 
dollars a year support with no strings attached for a fixed number of years, but some 
awards have been for lifetime support.  In either case, the recipients are not required to 
submit any kind of report to the foundation on how they use their time.  In the view of 
the MacArthur Foundation nominating committee, creative contributions are defined 
quite broadly.  For example, the recipients of MacArthur Fellowships represent a 
diverse set of domains, ranging from science and the arts to journalism, to law, to 
education, and to being a professional clown.   
 
In her discussions with the MacArthur Fellows, Shekerjian found several messages that 
came through strongly.  Some of these messages could be posed as recommendations 
for enhancing personal creativity from people with substantive credentials.  The 
“recommendations” include such things as finding your talent, honing that talent, and 
being willing to take risks.  One attitude common among the Fellows stressed that it is 
particularly important to "learn by doing."  Another attitude of interest involved the 
idea of forcing one’s self to look at the world in a new way or from a new perspective.  
For example, one of Shekerjian’s interviewees was a Pulitzer prize winning journalist 
who made a practice of taking a periodic leave of absence to go and live in the most 
remote, isolated village he could get to in a country which he had never visited and 
where he did not speak the language. 
 
In a recent literature review Nickerson (1999) suggests that there are reasons to believe 
that it is possible to teach some of the skills required to enhance creativity.  While there 
are factors other than personal skills that clearly come into play in producing a creative 
outcome, several of the skills that Nickerson suggests are teachable can also be posed as 
recommendations for enhancement of personal creativity.  All of these skills are 
consistent with a variety of research results, including study of the skills displayed by 
people with established records of creative work.  For example, it is a necessary 
precursor to creativity that a person believe they can be creative given enough 
motivation and effort.  In other words, enhancing creativity is somewhat akin to 
gambling--investing time and work in learning the game will not guarantee a winning 
streak, but, if you are not willing to put some effort and money into learning to play the 
game to win, the one thing that is certain is that you will not win in the long term. 
 
Even after developing a belief that motivation and effort are necessary and might pay 
off, that belief is clearly not sufficient to guarantee creative results.  As Nickerson points 
out, the individual must also have the goal of being creative and then proceed to engage 
in a deliberate program of building the basic skills that are fundamental to a basic 
education and to the acquisition of domain-specific knowledge.   Being intrinsically 
motivated to do the necessary work for the sake of personal achievement rather than 
extrinsic reward appears to be important, as does having a willingness to take risks, to 
exercise curiosity and to engage in domain exploration.  Furthermore, the willingness to 
take risks should be exercised in the context in which one is focused on domain mastery 
and self-competition rather than concerned about competition with others.  Nickerson 
also suggests that developing and practicing self-management of one's own cognitive 
resources and putting into practice techniques and strategies for facilitating one’s own 
performance may also be helpful.  Regardless of whether one has the goal of producing 
creative results or not, this notion of deliberate practice focused on personal 
improvement appears to be essential to the development of high levels of domain 
expertise (Ericsson, 1996).  Creativity in the absence of domain expertise just does not 
seem to happen (Gardiner, 1993). 
 
Notice that the material reviewed thus far is quite consistent with the view that creative 
products may result from normal cognitive processes being pushed into dealing with a 
problem or situation which initially appears to be solvable, but where the answer or 
way to proceed turns out to be unknown or different than what was originally 
expected.  In arguing for this point of view, Weisberg’s (1986) major thesis is the idea 
that creativity basically emerges from a person’s conscious work on a problem that does 
not solve easily.  This impasse forces modifications of earlier attempts to develop a 
solution.  The ongoing modifications make it clear that additional information or 
different strategies are required if a solution is to be found.  Thus, for Weisberg, and 
others (e.g., John-Steiner, 1997), one key idea is that the unsuccessful application of past 
experience leads to an incremental evolution into a solution that is creative, i.e., one that 
is both novel and appropriate to the situation at hand.  In this view, even though the 
product eventually created may be extraordinary, it is, nonetheless, the result of normal 
cognitive processes involving the use of an existing knowledge base and the extension 
of that knowledge into new areas of the problem domain. 
 
In a later work, Weisberg (1993) discusses what he considers to be the three central 
questions in the study of creativity.  Focusing on the individual, Weisberg explores the 
related issues of the origin of new ideas and whether it is possible to trace the 
antecedents of novel works (i.e., "the origin and development of creative works” p 242).  
Focusing on a comparison between individuals, Weisberg addresses the question of 
why novel works emerge from the work of one person rather than another who may 
seem to have similar characteristics and qualifications for producing creative work (i.e., 
what accounts for "the differences between creative individuals and others” (p. 242)).  
Focusing on the social aspects of creativity, Weisberg explores the question of why 
some works tend to be valued and others not. 
 
In answer to the question of whether or not it is possible to trace the antecedents of 
creative work in an individual’s thinking over time, Weisberg (1993) proposes that 
answer is a tentative "yes."   He also notes that while not all creative works appear to 
begin with an analogy, enough do to support the hypothesis of analogical similarity as a 
source of creative insight.  "The changes from initial idea to final work occur first 
because an individual can anticipate and respond to difficulties with a work before it is 
actually produced; and second, the work-in-progress can be judged inadequate, in 
which case attempts will be made to modify it." (p. 255)  In addition, "Change in a work 
can also occur as the result of external events triggering a shift in direction.” (p. 255)  In 
his discussion Weisberg stresses the importance of the perception of identity 
relationships between two problems and the role of analogy and metaphor in creating a 
sense of similarity between two situations. 
 
In summary then, there are several reasons to believe that there are techniques under 
the control of an individual that can be utilized to improve the likelihood of coming up 
with a creative result.   Similarly it seems that many of these techniques may well be 
both teachable and learnable.  These observations clearly justify the efforts to constrain 
the design and development of computer-based working environments for creativity 
support on the basis of user requirements that help to optimize working conditions for 
the individual and to support or those techniques or strategies that enhance creative 
work. 
 
3.0  Does creative work differ across domains? 
The issue of whether creative processes differ from one domain to another appears to 
rest upon whether one focuses on the work and processes or upon the product that 
results.  The position taken in this paper is that while the products and domains of 
creative work may differ widely and in many ways, it is the domains, their associated 
constraints, and the resulting products, that differ.  The fundamental processes and 
conditions required to make creative work possible, some of the most important parts 
of the development of creative products, are not domain specific.   
 
The domains of creative work that have been studied all seem to require the 
mobilization of appropriate chunks and bits of knowledge and the other components of 
domain specific expertise such as motor skills, habits of thought, etc.  All domains 
require that domain specific knowledge and skills be combined with the identification 
and/or clarification of the constraints operating in the situation.  In all domains the 
knowledge, skills and constraints will shape the sorting through and identification of 
the appropriate building blocks that ultimately become part of a creative result.  Finally 
all domains require the development of a vision--the pattern of relationships among 
building blocks--that becomes transformed into some sort of reality.  The creative 
process must then consist in part of bringing all these things together at one time and 
place in an appropriate combination to produce a creative result. 
 
One important mode of thinking in this process involves the formation and use of 
analogies with which to think about and to understand a domain based problem or 
challenge.  Analogical thinking has been shown to play a critical role in producing at 
least some creative products in more than one domain (e.g., Bonnardel, 1999; Candy & 
Edmonds, 1995; Dominowsky & Dollub, 1995; Isaak & Just, 1995; Miller, 2000; Weisberg, 
1993).  It would clearly seem to be the case that, while the content of analogies might 
differ across domains, the process of analogical thinking remains basically the same 
regardless of the domain.  To use an analogy, the memory contents of an expert in one 
domain will clearly differ from the memory contents of an expert in another domain, 
but the conditions influencing whether or not particular bits or chunks of that 
knowledge will be remembered are basically the same across individuals, regardless of 
their domain expertise.  So, generally speaking, the salience and/or recency with which 
certain knowledge has been used both tend to influence ease of remembering that 
knowledge.  Knowledge and skills employed yesterday or with great frequency are 
generally more accessible than knowledge and skills last used some years ago. 
 
Another way to state the claim made here is that the difference between art and 
invention, between art and science, or between any two forms of creative endeavor, lies 
primarily in the domain and the constraints imposed by the domain or imported by the 
individual.  For example, in the Ode to Joy movement of his 9th Symphony, Beethoven 
uses both the poetry of Schiller and his own music to communicate and mutually 
reinforce an emotional content that is communicated to some degree by each form of 
expression in the absence of the other.  Musical composition has a somewhat different 
set of constraints than does the composition of poetry, but in this work Beethoven 
managed to produce an integrated whole which, for many listeners, has an impact that 
goes far beyond any effect achieved by either mode of artistic expression experienced 
separately. 
  
Domain constraints may actually be similar across more than one domain but be 
weighted differently or given more importance in one domain than in another.  For 
example, one obvious constraint imposed on the process of invention of a new artifact is 
that the end product must have utility or value on some grounds other than the 
communication of an aesthetic effect.  Aesthetic concerns may be and often are present, 
but they may have to be subordinated to or be co-equal with functionality or other 
constraints.  For example, the design of a vacuum cleaner which is pleasing to look at 
and comfortable to use can be considered a design failure if it can not be manufactured 
on the client’s assembly line, packaged conveniently or shipped inexpensively to the 
point of sale location (Dreyfuss, 1955).  Similarly, suspension bridges have a primary 
function which is quite utilitarian and which can only be ignored at tremendous cost, 
However, the need for functionality does not prevent bridges from being designed with 
certain aesthetic and financial considerations in mind as well (Petroski, 1996a).   
 
In his exploration of design thinking, Rowe (1987) emphasizes two fundamental aspects 
of the design process.  First, design thinking has a sequential step-by-step character.  
Second, design thinking is also well characterized as being a cyclical iterative process in 
which earlier steps may be repeated.  In other words, while the designer may move 
through a sequence of steps it is clearly the case that the designer can and does cycle 
back to modify and repeat earlier steps as needed and then feed the new results 
forward into future steps.  This is a description that seems to characterize many, if not 
all, domains in which people do creative work.  For example, in an essay discussing the 
"evolving systems approach" to creative work, Gruber (1989) proposes that, "all 
examples of creative insights occur within protracted creative processes."  Several 
illustrations of this phenomenon, and of a number of the other characteristics of creative 
work, appear in case study accounts in Wallace and Gruber (1989).  Each case study 
author has focused on illuminating the creative product(s) and processes of a person 
notable for their contributions to some domain of art or science (e.g., Lavoisier, 
Wordsworth, Darwin).  The common approach of each case study involves historical 
reconstruction of the individual’s contribution and of the work leading up to their 
creative product through the use of notebooks, letters, etc.   Also an integral part of each 
case study is a description of the multiple contexts in which the creator worked (e.g., 
work tasks, family, professional environment, etc.).  One of the consistencies emerging 
from the historical records of multiple case studies is a pattern of activities much like 
that described by Rowe (1986) for the domain of design. 
 
Similarly, Petroski (1996b) recounts the history of a number of engineered artifacts.  In 
these cases one or more individuals have repeatedly engaged in working with an object 
or artifact (e.g., a paper clip or a pencil) to attempt to redesign it and reduce or eliminate 
its failings.  This iterative interaction with artifacts has led to their incremental 
improvements over time, either by one person or by a series of people.  One focus of 
Petroski’s work is to look at how successful innovators in engineering must both devise 
new technology and also find a way of fitting it into the constraints imposed by the 
world in which they live.  Using case histories of familiar and well documented items 
such as paper clips, aluminum cans, pencil points and zippers allows Petroski to 
explore the nature of invention, design and development in the context of the 
economics, aesthetics, and personal idiosyncrasies that play a part in the final result.  As 
in the case studies in Wallace and Gruber (1989), one of the consistent patterns that 
emerges is a set of activities much like those described by Rowe (1986). 
 
4.0  The importance and nature of insight 
For a variety of reasons illustrated in some of the work already described and to be 
covered below, another explicit claim made here is that insight—a flash of recognition 
of a new relationship or new organization of knowledge--is very often a key ingredient 
in creative work of many kinds.  Furthermore, an insight often emerges after intensive 
interaction with a domain related problem.  Thus, understanding The Nature of Insight 
and the conditions under which insight occurs should inform the way in which we 
design, develop and deploy Creative Problem Solving Environments (CPSEs) in a wide 
variety of domains.  A CPSE should not block or inhibit insight. 
 
Although it would be rash to claim that all creative products result from an insight, the 
phenomenon of insight appears to be central enough to the process of creative work of 
many kinds that it should be explored.   But first, an explicit reminder should be stated. 
As pointed out earlier, it is not possible to either command or predict in advance when 
an insight, an innovation, or a creative work will occur.  However, as the discussion 
below points out, there are a number of conditions, which can be seen, as necessary to 
ensuring that novel insights are not blocked from occurring by the individual’s working 
environment even though the presence of these conditions is not sufficient to cause 
insight.  
 
As a non-trivial example of a necessary but not sufficient condition for insight, if an 
individual or group does not have a strong affective involvement with the problem to 
be solved and believe in the importance of the work (Gruber, 1995; cf. Csikszentmihalyi 
& Sawyer, 1995; Dunbar, 1995) innovation is very unlikely to occur.  In other words, 
strong motivation will not guarantee results, but without it innovative results are not 
likely.  Consequently, the claim made in this paper is that currently we do understand 
some of the necessary conditions under which insight and innovation can occur, but we 
do not yet have sufficient knowledge to guarantee that insight and innovation will 
occur just because some of the appropriate preconditions are present.  Effectively, we 
do know some things, but the best that can be said at this stage of our knowledge is that 
it is possible to take steps to avoid getting in the way when we develop tools to support 
creative work.  However, when working with computing systems, being able to stay out 
of the way would be a step forward. 
 
Before reviewing some of the research on the conditions under which insight may 
occur, one question that must be addressed early on is whether insight is or is not a 
psychological real phenomenon.  That is, when someone reports having had an insight, 
is this an accurate report of an actual mental event?  Or, as some have argued, is the 
sense of having had an insight a side effect of some other process or event that has 
proceeded outside of conscious awareness?  Historically, the debate over whether or not 
there is a mental event such as insight goes back to the 1930s and the Gestalt 
Psychologists’ views of problem solving (Davidson, 2003).  The Gestalt Psychologists 
argued strongly that the key to problem solution involves a restructuring of problem 
elements that may, or may not, lead to a sudden realization of a problem's solution.  
However, other theorists believe that problem solving involves an incremental process 
of getting closer and closer to a solution.  This has led to a distinction being drawn 
between "insight problems" and "non-insight problems."   The defining characteristic of 
a non-insight problem is that it involves analytical, step-by-step processing, e.g., 
problems in chess, arithmetic, logic, etc.  The defining characteristic of insight problems 
is that the solution seems to appear suddenly, without any obvious connection to the 
immediately prior activities. 
 
In a useful review of the different psychological theories that have been proposed to 
explore and to try to understand the phenomenon of insight, Davidson (2003) argues 
that certain commonalities have emerged from the various research traditions 
stimulated by these theories.  Davidson notes that one commonality in the findings of 
all four research traditions is the important role played by old knowledge in helping 
individuals come up with new insights into the problem(s) with which they are dealing.  
In other words, the right bits of knowledge have to be available.  The second major 
common theme Davidson finds running through the results of all four research threads 
is the importance of "restructuring of mental representation" of the problem.  Also, 
Davidson goes on to point out that all four approaches to the study of insight have 
found, "…that prior knowledge and its match (or mismatch) with new information can 
lead to the restructuring of a non-routine problem” (p. 170). 
 
Some work on people's understanding of their own problem solving processes suggests 
there is indeed a difference between insight and non-insight problems (Metcalfe, 1986a, 
b ; Metcalfe & Weibe, 1987).   Participants who were asked to judge their degree of 
closeness to solution in working on both types of problems provided data that were 
consistent with there being a real difference between the two problem types.  For non-
insight problems, the study participants were better able to estimate their degree of 
closeness to a solution and were more accurate in evaluating the likelihood that they 
would in fact solve the problem than they were for insight problems. 
 
As the technology for recording brain activities has become more sophisticated, it now 
appears that the debate over whether insight involves different kinds of mental 
processes than does routine problem solving is on its way to being resolved.   Recent 
brain event recording experiments (e.g., Jung-Beeman et al., 2004) have demonstrated 
that there are significantly different patterns of neural activity for ordinary and for 
insightful problem solving.  In effect the brain appears to marshal its resources 
differently for the two types of problems. 
 
4.1  Conditions required to foster insight and innovation 
An important first step in developing an understanding of conditions that facilitate the 
development of insight and innovation is to dispel an erroneous impression.  For a 
variety of reasons, there is widespread belief in the efficacy of incubation, a period 
when the problem is simply set aside, in facilitating insightful thinking.  This belief 
appears to stem from the work of Wallas (1926) who proposed a categorization of stages 
of problem solving, one of which was incubation.  This categorization was post hoc in 
that it was based upon several anecdotal accounts provided by scientists, artists and 
writers.  The difficulty with this type of analysis is that the analysis only looks at part of 
the data, the cases where there was a setting aside of the problem and an insight 
occurred.  It does not tell us much about insights occurring without setting aside a 
problem or about the relative frequency of instances where a problem was set-aside 
without any insight resulting.   
 
The more critical difficulty with the notion of incubation as a technique to enhance 
creativity, as it is usually presented, is that empirical research typically fails to provide 
convincing evidence that incubation works (Dominowsky & Jenrick, 1972; Eindhoven & 
Vinacke, 1952; Olton, 1979; Olton & Johnson, 1976; Patrick, 1937).  Rather it appears that 
if anything resembling incubation effects occur at all they do so only under a very 
specific set of circumstances (Smith, 1995).  These circumstances are that the problem 
must actually be doable and the solver is blocked in some way from the solution by 
active information or knowledge which currently interferes with seeing the solution but 
which becomes less salient over time (Smith & Blankenship, 1989). 
 
In discussing the processes by which insights appear to arise, Csikszentmihalyi and 
Sawyer (1995) argue that insight is part of an extended mental process requiring total 
immersion in the problem.  They suggest that the length of the innovation process also 
depends upon whether one is doing problem solving or problem finding.  Furthermore, 
insights are characterized by a synthesis of information from more than one symbolic 
domain and that the before and after parts of the process appear to be heavily social in 
the sense that communication with others is important.  In addition Csikszentmihalyi 
and Sawyer (1995) provide a list of conditions under which insight or creative 
innovations are unlikely to occur.  For example, it seems clear that innovation will not 
occur without motivation and time for reflection, along with the opportunity (or 
inclination) to test possibilities.  In addition innovation is unlikely to occur without a 
thorough grounding in one domain, without contact with others from another domain 
and without interaction with other domain experts. 
 
Dunbar (1995) has explored some aspects of the importance and nature of contact and 
communication with others from the same or a related domain in the development of 
innovations in doing scientific research.  His results suggest that the more successful 
research groups involve people with overlapping but non-identical backgrounds who 
have ample opportunity to interact and discuss research on overlapping but not 
identical projects.  He also points out that successful research interactions appear to 
involve small groups working on similar projects and that the members of these groups 
tend to engage in analogical reasoning in working with each other and with people 
from other groups working on similar projects.  In addition, Dunbar suggests that 
researchers who want to increase the likelihood of a creative insight should engage in a 
mixture of both low and high risk projects, that any surprising results should be 
especially noted, and that the researchers should create a library of problem analogs 
which can be modified and used in the future (cf. Dominowski & Dollub, 1995; Isaak & 
Just, 1995). 
 
As noted above, the environment in which one works can inhibit innovation or it can 
contribute to the opportunity for insight to occur by reducing known factors that work 
against the development of insight.  For example, Mayer (1995) has observed that 
insight can arise in many different ways.  He goes on to argue that this diversity implies 
that, in facilitating innovative problem solving, it is important to create systems and 
environments that are tailorable by the individual (cf. Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).   One 
interpretation of what a tailorable environment might be like is offered by Ippolito and 
Tweney (1995) who suggest that a working environment to facilitate innovation should 
make possible both the perceptual aspects of problem representations (e.g., visual, 
auditory, tactile, etc.) as well as abstract and abstracted representations (e.g., numbers, 
figures, tables, etc.).  Furthermore, Ippolito and Tweney propose that it should be 
possible for the individual to combine these representations and/or use them to 
construct mental models for test and evaluation. 
 
The ability to combine and recombine different representations of problems and their 
elemental parts may very well facilitate the identification or elimination of constraints 
that inhibit innovative problem solving (Isaak & Just, 1995).  For example, Finke (1995) 
reports on several studies, which suggest that to facilitate insight it is important to 
understand the basic elemental component pieces with which the person might work to 
create innovations.  Thus it is necessary to provide tools and techniques for generating 
those basic pieces and for exploring their creative possibilities.  Furthermore Finke 
suggests the idea of developing software to automate the generation of basic elemental 
components and all possible combinations so as to allow exploration and identification 
of promising creative paths. 
 
Focusing on the role of problem constraints on problem solving, Isaak and Just (1995) 
propose that insight or innovative problem solving involves identification of the 
constraints and then working out a way to release, to relax, or to change those 
constraints.  They go on to argue that invention requires iterative cycles of constraint 
release and imposition, with appropriate constraining operations being applied during 
each phase of invention.  Isaak and Just also propose the creation of a problem analysis 
tool that asks for identification of the design space limitations in the form of precise 
well-elaborated statements of the goal of the invention.  These statements constrain the 
design search space more effectively than vague statements of the problem (cf. Finke, 
1995).  Additional design space limitations that need to be identified are the 
technological feasibility of the innovation and any additional constraints (e.g., critical 
features and limitations) that can be identified from study of any existing earlier 
precursors of the invention or innovation (cf. Dominowski & Dallob, 1995).  Turning 
their attention to generation of new designs, Isaak and Just (1995) propose that the 
initial constraints on a design are derived from implicit analogies and that one should 
engage in analogical and combinatorial play to facilitate the reformulation of invention 
constraints (cf., Finke, 1995).  Finally, Isaak and Just propose that design analysis should 
involve analysis of any existing designs and/or analogs to the desired invention. 
 
Further support for the importance of an archive of prior problems to serve as analogs 
to stimulate thinking for future problems appears in the work of Dominowski and 
Dallob (1995).  These authors propose that one useful major component of an 
environment to facilitate insight or innovation is a library of practice problems that are 
similar to those that the person needs to solve.  Their recommendations suggest that 
this library should include four major components.  First the library should contain 
mechanisms and suggestions for re-representation of the practice problems (cf. Ippolito 
& Tweney, 1995).  Second, the library should contain stories about the problem solving 
process engaged in by others as examples (i.e., “war” stories describing problems and 
solution procedures that worked and didn’t work).  Third, the library should contain 
examples that focus on identification and removal of constraints that inhibit innovative 
problem solving.  For example, breaking up functional fixedness and problem solving 
set.  Functional fixedness is the tendency to think of something as having only its 
intended function and failing to see that it can be used to serve other functions, such as 
using a small coin in place of a screwdriver to tighten a bolt.  Problem solving set 
describes the tendency to solve problems that appear to be similar to each other using 
the same routine procedure, without realizing that there may be a simpler or more 
efficient procedure.  Often this routine solution procedures can be just fine but 
sometimes the old “tried and true” procedures can inhibit the recognition that new ones 
may be better or even prevent one from recognizing that an entirely new strategy may 
be required. 
 
Holyoak and Thagard (1995) also discuss some of the research literature on analogical 
thinking and creativity.   They point out that analogical thinking can be a "two-edged 
sword" in that it appears in some cases to be the source of at least some creative insights 
and it appears in other cases to be a trap that can lead people astray.   In their summary 
chapter they suggest that creative construction of a useful analogy with which to think 
about a problem can be facilitated by the use of multiple analogs.  However, they point 
out that we have no good theory to tell us which source analog is the most appropriate 
one to use in constructing the target.  Furthermore, it is not clear how to best combine 
multiple source analogs when they are potentially combinable rather than in 
competition with each other. 
 
4.2  The importance of an “external” representation 
As noted above, working with a mental image or with some sort of external 
representation of developing ideas is a common characteristic of many people who 
have produced creative products.  Similarly, Miller (2000) stresses the important role 
that mental imagery has played in the history of physics.  The importance of mental 
imagery is an emergent theme in many of the case study reports described in Wallace 
and Gruber (1989).  However, the creation of a representation of a problem that is useful 
in thinking about that problem may take forms other than that of mental imagery.   
Indeed, working with objects in the world is a natural part of what many creative 
people do.  For example, the designer of the Lotus racing bicycle, Mike Burrows, is 
quoted in Candy and Edmonds (1996) as describing his own work in the following way, 
"I literally think with my hands...just pick pieces of metal out of the rack and drill 
holes...." 
 
Or consider the following quotation: 
 
“Revell told me an interesting anecdote concerning how he and his 
partners came upon the idea of the Toronto Town Hall--two segments 
facing each other with a circular assembly building in the centre.  It was 
getting near the date for the competition and they were working through 
the night without having a satisfactory solution.  The overhead lampshade 
threw a strange shadow on the drawing board in front of them.  Viljo was 
idly sketching in the outline of the shadow when it suddenly dawned on 
them.  Here was the exact shape of the perfect solution!“ (Mardall, 1968, p. 
198) 
 
In other words, working professionals use tools such as drawing, making models, 
taking pictures, producing or printing out intermediate results, etc. as a way of 
extending memory, a way of self-education and experiment and as a way of 
communication with others.  For example, Robbins (1997) argues that architects use 
drawing as their design instrument since they need a tool that enables them to 
externalize and test their thinking and engage in communication with others.  John-
Steiner (1997) describes similar processes in several domains of artistic and/or 
intellectual endeavor.  Furthermore, her discussion ranges broadly across different 
modes of external representation of thought in addition to the purely visual.  John-
Steiner stresses the importance of the idea that the creation of external representations 
with which to think is an important part of the process of internalization and 
integration of new information with existing knowledge structures and processes. 
 
5.0  Mental processes, activities of creative work and functional requirements 
Given that analogical thinking is important to the development of new insights in 
science, are there reasons to believe one can design CPSEs specifically to support and 
facilitate analogical thinking and other forms of creative activities?  Some indicators can 
be found in the work of Candy and Edmonds (Candy & Edmonds, 1995, 1996; Edmonds 
& Candy, 1996) who have studied a variety of knowledge workers (e.g., a racing bicycle 
designer, a speech scientist, a concept vehicle designer, etc.).  In their work they also 
have found analogical thinking to be important for creative work (Candy & Edmonds, 
1995).  For example, Candy and Edmonds (1996) worked closely with the designer of 
the Lotus Sport racing bicycle.  (The introduction of this bicycle design into Olympic 
competition represented a successful major re-conceptualization of how racing bicycles 
should be designed.)  Of particular importance to the work of this designer was being 
able to move his design ideas from one analogous domain to another. 
  
Candy and Edmonds (1995) have proposed a process model for understanding how 
scientists, designers, and other knowledge workers interact with their subject matter.  
Resulting from work developing Knowledge Support Systems (Edmonds & Candy, 
1993) and from observations conducted of experts at work (Candy & Edmonds, 1997; 
Candy, 1998; Edmonds & Candy, 1993, Candy et al., 1993), the Candy and Edmonds 
process model focuses on three modes of human activity.  In one mode, Exploration and 
Evaluation, the critical activities consist of examining data, applying existing rules for 
analysis of data, and evaluating and refining rules for data analysis.  In a second mode, 
Generation and Invention, the critical activities consist of examination of data and 
development of new insights, which can be applied to other aspects of the process, e.g., 
creating new rules for data analysis.  The third activity mode, Consideration of the 
problem constraints and requirements, involves identifying, clarifying, and revising 
constraints and requirements that limit or shape the end product.  Notice the degree to 
which this process model also consistent with the observations of many of the 
researchers described above. 
 
Candy and Edmonds (1995) have also proposed software design criteria and extended 
their work to develop a criterion based approach to interactive system design (Candy & 
Edmonds, 1997).  Several aspects of this work apply to the design of CPSEs.  For 
example, some consistencies emerging from the work of Candy and Edmonds are that 
the user should, at any time, be able: 1) to take a holistic view, i.e., be able to “step back” 
and look at the whole picture; 2) to temporarily suspend judgment on any matter; 3) to 
make unplanned deviations; 4) to return to an old idea and goal; 5) to formulate 
problems as well as solve problems; and 6) to reformulate the problem space as the 
conception of the problem or the work in progress evolves over time. 
 
Focusing on recommendations for software tool design, Shneiderman has proposed a 
conceptually similar analysis in some of his recent work (1999, 2000).  Shneiderman 
introduces a taxonomy of the types of task related activities that seem to characterize 
various component processes involved with several aspects of human creative work.  
These activities involve: 1) searching and browsing digital libraries; 2) visualizing data 
and processes; 3) consulting with peers and mentors; 4) thinking by free associations; 5) 
exploring solutions using "what-if" tools; 6) composing artifacts and performances; 7) 
reviewing and replaying session histories; and 8) disseminating results.  He suggests 
that these tasks are to a greater or lesser degree involved in one or more of four basic 
activities--Collect, Relate, Create, Donate--that he proposes as being characteristic of 
human creative work 
 
Applying and extending the work of Candy & Edmonds (1995), Hewett and DePaul 
(2000) argued for a set of design requirements that should guide the design and 
development of human-centered problem solving environments (PSEs) intended for use 
in science and engineering.  In addition, they argued that a PSE to support such 
complex innovative work should satisfy the following functional requirements (cf. the 
earlier discussion of factors which facilitate the possibility of insight and innovation):   
 The PSE should:  
 1) Provide a library of macros and analogs.  
 2) Make possible multiple alternative representations of domain-based problems.  
 3) Allow those multiple problem representations to be simultaneous so that they 
can be compared and tested and evaluated. 
 4) Allow for flexible and tailorable usage of the working environment.  
 5) Allow multiple configurations of the working environment and its tools that can 
be saved and restarted so that having to work on multiple projects does not require a 
shut down and reassembly every time the problem solver switches their attention from 
one problem to another. 
 6) Support a variety of multiple store and find operations. 
 7) Provide multiple access routes into archives and repositories or relevant data or 
other information. 
 8) Log processes and intermediate results to enable the user to easily recapture 
these results.  
 9) Make it possible for the user to re-configure or re-define the problem domain.  
Sometimes in working on a problem what one accomplishes first is development of an 
understanding of what the “real” problem is. 
 
In the discussions of insight and of creative work above, there are clear rationale for 
claiming that this list of functional requirements is in fact applicable to the design of 
CPSEs in domains other than Science and Engineering.  Much of the discussion of 
insight provides clear justification for the importance of providing a creative worker 
with access to a library of stored analogs of both end products and of component parts 
and processes.  Multiple alternative representations of the domain content and/or 
structure plays a role allowing the creative worker to explore different visions or “what 
if?”courses of actions needed to add to existing knowledge.  Having the ability to view 
alternate representations simultaneously allows the necessary instantiation of different 
possibilities that can then be compared or evaluated for how they fit with the emerging 
“solution.”   
 The importance of tailorability of a working environment for creative work has been 
stressed in the work of several people reviewed earlier, as has the importance of 
allowing creative workers to shift work from one problem domain to another related 
domain with different constraints, etc.  Similarly, taken as a group, these particular user 
requirements provide functionality that would enable the creative worker to do several 
important things.  For example, all of the factors above would make possible the ability 
to engage in the type of domain exploration that is so much a part of the lives of 
creative people (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Wallace & Gruber, 1989; John-Steiner, 1997; 
Nickerson, 1999; Shekerjian, 1990).  Any computer based working environment with 
these characteristics would provide multiple ways of externalizing thought and of 
testing one’s own understanding and thinking about the solution or creative product 
being developed.  
 
The type of flexibility provided by allowing multiple store and find operations and by 
providing multiple access routes into information archives or repositories seems to be 
clearly justified by the fact that in creative work one often does not know in advance 
exactly when a new piece of information or a new component will be needed.  
Similarly, auto logging of intermediate results and/or paths by which one got to a 
current state or situation in their thinking can greatly facilitate the process of 
recapturing what choices were being made at certain points and why they were being 
made.  Finally, if an insight into the problem being worked on takes place and results in 
a reconfiguration of the creative worker’s knowledge or understanding of what he or 
she is doing it can be essential to allow for the reconfiguration of the CPSE as well.  
Among other things, all of these user requirements would facilitate the process of 
domain constraint exploration described by Isaak & Just (1995). 
 
Considering the work reviewed here, it seems reasonable to claim that the set of 
functional requirements listed above is actually a domain independent generic set of 
requirements to which any CPSE, regardless of the domain of activity, should be 
designed.  While an actual CPSE, a “point solution” for one domain of creative work, 
will differ from another, the functionalities themselves are to be thought of as being 
general and domain independent.  For example, a creative writer at work needs to be 
able to do things with a developing product, i.e., write, edit and revise.  But this person 
also needs some mechanism for being able to capture ideas that occur during the 
writing process.  The most useful solution is one that allows for an effortless, almost 
reflexive capture of the idea in a way that does not disrupt the work flow but which 
allows the writer to quickly capture the idea or insight, returning to it later for 
evaluation, etc.  This same type of need exists for a composer developing a new work.  
The particular instantiation and form of the “ideas” will differ, but the need for easy 
capture that does not disrupt the workflow is there for both.  Finally, it should be noted 
that the set of functional or user requirements proposed above is almost certainly a 
subset and that more thinking needs to go into the development and articulation of 
others. 
 
Another point that needs to be about the design and development of CPSEs is the 
importance of making it possible for there to be simultaneous multiple problem 
representations which can be viewed or manipulated independently.  In many types of 
intellectual endeavor it is important to be able to compare alternative possibilities or 
alternative scenarios.  For example, in working with representations of data from an 
epidemiological investigation, the visible similarities and differences between two sets 
of data may only be detectable when the data representations are placed side-by-side or 
layered on top of each other.  In discussing the domain of design thinking, Lawson 
(1993) has argued that one fundamental aspect of creative design thinking is the ability 
to work in parallel on more than one aspect of a design without having to make a final 
commitment to any one aspect.  Clearly there is a need for simultaneous multiple 
alternative representations.  While the question of whether representations need to be 
layered or side-by-side for comparisons may have to be answered in the context of a 
particular domain of effort, it is important that simultaneous representations be 
possible. 
 
6.0  The workbench metaphor for a creativity support environment 
As the discussion above demonstrates, an individual engaged in activities which have a 
creative result as a goal, or who winds up producing an innovation, even if that was not 
the original intent, will engage in a number of activities and bring several skills and 
processes to bear over time.  Some of these activities, skills and processes can be 
anticipated in advance.  The need for others may only emerge clearly from the 
individual’s interaction with their domain and the constraints imposed by that domain.  
Clearly a broad range of user requirements need to be taken into account in thinking 
about the design, development and deployment of a working creativity support 
environment.  For example, as Csikszentmihalyi (1996) and others whose work has been 
described here (e.g., Shekerjian, 1990; Mayer, 1995; etc.) have pointed out, one of the 
factors that appears to enhance creativity is the individual being able to take and 
exercise control over his or her own working environment.  In addition this control 
must make possible the dynamic modification of that environment as the problem, the 
understanding of the problem, or the domain change over time. 
 
The need for tailorability of working environments poses the question of how best to 
structure a working environment for the high degree of tailorability demanded by 
creative work.  The approach to thinking about and organizing CPSEs suggested here is 
the notion of the Virtual Workbench.  To explore the notion of a virtual workbench, 
consider a physical workbench.  This working environment has a workspace in which 
activities take place.  Connected to, or associated with this workbench, is a large set of 
basic components and a kit of tools, each of which has some special purpose use, e.g., 
nuts, bolts, nails, pliers, a hammer, different types of wrenches, saws and drills, etc.  All 
of these artifacts are stored in locations that make them easily accessible.  In some 
workshops one will find a large pegboard with hooks for storing the tools.  Quite often 
the outline of each tool has been painted on the board to facilitate location of tools and 
replacement of each tool to its expected location.  The individual using this literal 
workbench either assembles the subset of parts, subassemblies and tools to be used for a 
special task, e.g., repair of a broken toaster or a broken chair, or has each tool and part 
immediately ready to hand so that it can be called upon and used when or if the need 
arises.   
 
Belief in the viability of a workbench metaphor as a generic way of thinking about the 
design, development and deployment of computer based working environments in 
general, is partially supported by recent work on development of Problem Solving 
Environments (PSEs) for scientists and engineers (Hewett & DePaul, 2000; Johnson, et 
al. 1998), and with a recent workshop on PSEs (Bramley et al. 2000).   This workshop on 
PSEs drew together several of the leading researchers and developers of PSEs for a 3 
day session to assess the current status and future directions for work in PSEs for 
science and engineering.   
 
Among the results emerging from that workshop was the notion that a PSE for group of 
experts in science and/or engineering can be best conceived of and organized as a 
virtual workbench consisting of a collection of tools and components which can be 
selectively brought to bear on each of a series of problems, assembling and re-
assembling different configurations of components and tools, depending upon the 
problem or task demands.  This model for thinking about how a PSE should be 
designed represents a conceptual shift from the work on PSEs for science and 
engineering in the 1970s when it was thought that a PSE should be a single monolithic 
program that did everything.  (E.g., An equation solver that would handle any ordinary 
or partial differential equation you might want to give it to solve.)  The problems that 
emerged from this approach were that often such general-purpose packages became 
cumbersome for the user to be able to use, difficult for the software engineers to 
maintain, and difficult for either users or software engineers to modify because of the 
complexity of the PSE.  
 
Conceptually, the domain expert engaged in creative work of any kind already occupies 
a virtual workspace and literal workspace in which domain knowledge use, knowledge 
representation and interactive modification of one or more domain related “artifacts” 
takes place.  Connected to or associated with this workspace the domain expert should 
have a set of component parts, subassemblies and models, along with a range of 
conceptual and software tools which can be assembled and/or reassembled in different 
configurations as the understanding of the domain problem changes or when one 
problem has been completed and it is time to begin working on another.  The 
appropriate virtual workbench configuration can then brought to bear as the need 
arises in working with a particular combination of domain problems and colleagues.   
 
6.1  Major components for CPSEs 
Consideration of the Virtual Workbench and many of the functional requirements 
described above suggests two things.  First, by virtue of its very nature, the workbench 
metaphor actually incorporates in its basic design several of the functional requirements 
described earlier.  Inherently, a workbench involves special purpose tools that can be 
used and reused in any of a variety of tasks.  Those tools can be configured or brought 
into use in a way that suits the needs of the person using the workbench/tool set.  
Furthermore, any workbench to support complex problem solving and creative 
activities will have some tools that can be used in more than one domain or 
environment.  
 
A second point to note is that any domain specific CPSE can be expected to have at least 
some major components which are common across several domains of creative work.   
The major concern in this section of the paper is to describe some of the support 
capabilities or components that any CPSE, regardless of its domain should offer.  The 
focus is on three inter-related support facilities, some of the relationships among these 
support facilities and between these support facilities and the rest of a set of domain 
specific CPSE.  For example, any working environment such as a computer-based CPSE 
will require an “owner’s manual,” i.e. a Help Library.  In addition, to support the 
maintenance and improvement of the CPSE, online report and annotation functions 
should be provided.  Finally, the support environment for any CPSE should take 
advantage of the power of hyper-linkages and make it possible for the user of a domain 
specific CPSE to access context specific help and other components of the CPSE. 
  
In considering an overall vision for CPSEs, it is quite likely that almost any kit of tools 
for a domain specific virtual workbench will include tools that allow visualization of 
structures, visualization of processes, tracing of processes, pre-packaged routines or 
functions, and modifiable code/structures/processes.  It is importance that hyper-
linkages be used to make possible context sensitive access to help or to reminders of 
how something is used.  Furthermore, access to this information should be possible 
from any place within the CPSE where it might be needed or applicable (Meadow, 
Hewett & Aversa, 1982a, 1982b).  In effect, this functionality would make the entire 
CPSE working environment easily browsed from anywhere within that environment.  
For example, when utilizing one of the CPSE tools, it should be possible to simply click 
on a button and have access to a menu of information about the tool, help on the tool, 
exemplars of its use, the history of an existing “artifact,” etc.  Such functionality can 
reduce the burden on human memory considerably and help to eliminate or reduce the 
impact of distractions created by imperfect knowledge of all the complexities of the 
CPSE.  Since human time is much more expensive than computer time it seems quite 
reasonable to ask that the computer bear the burden of support for human memory in 
ways that reduce cognitive load. 
 
Similarly, the virtual workbench should have a user expandable library of re-usable 
“objects,” either literally or metaphorically as appropriate.  Depending upon the 
domain being supported, these objects should include, for example, components, 
subassemblies of components, models, and design patterns.  Since it is intended that 
each of these objects can be “copied and pasted for re-use”, it should also be possible to 
simply click on a button and have access to a menu of information about the object, 
including information about the object itself, help on the use of the object and 
exemplars of use.  In addition, since the intent is that these objects are reusable, attached 
to each object there should be information about the allowable structural changes that 
can be made to the object and the list of values to be edited.  In addition, the creative 
worker should be able to create a subset of components as needed for future use.  The 
presence of hyper-linkages would make it possible for the CPSE user to access generic 
help, tool specific help, item specific help, information on use and reuse from virtually 
anywhere within the environment. 
 
6.1.1 The CPSE “owner’s manual.”   
Structured more or less along the lines of a standard user’s manual, this segment of the 
CPSE user support capabilities should provide such things as a Table of Contents and 
an Index.  Also included should be a basic review and description of the purpose, 
operation, and contents of the user manual.  In addition, each of the artifacts referred to 
in the manual, be it tool, component, subassembly, model or design pattern, should 
have associated with it a general introduction to the object or artifact and a discussion 
of its use.  Here hyper-links will also make it possible to: a) cross reference terms or 
other artifacts as needed; and b) pull up examples of one or more uses of the object or 
artifact.  For example, a tool description would provide a description of the 
functionality of the tool.  It would specify its input, output and use.  Finally, the 
description would provide access to examples of use in practice and even enable the 
CPSE user try out the tool with a “training wheels” problem in the domain of interest.  
Research on the “training wheels” approach illustrates its support value in human-
centered computing (e.g., Carroll & Carrithers, 1984; Meadow et al. 1982a, 1982b). 
 
6.1.2  The CPSE notebook, online report and annotation form.   
With every complex computer program or computer-based working environment 
comes the problem of bugs or software design choices which have unintended 
consequences that interfere with the user’s ability to function most effectively.  
Consequently, ongoing improvement and maintenance of a CPSE is a set of activities 
that can and must be provided for in the most effective manner possible.  At any time 
the user of a CPSE needs to be able to quickly and easily file a critical incident report 
without major disruption of their work.  The user should not have to spend 5 minutes 
(or more) working out how to report a problem.  If they do, they will not file the report.  
In this critical incident report, which would be stored in an online report file, the user 
would be able to file bug reports and comments about the usability, and re-usability, of 
any tool or component contained in the CPSE.  Included automatically along with this 
report would be a record of the context in which the report was activated and filed, 
thereby eliminating the need for the CPSE user to try to describe that context and steps 
leading up to a problem.  This would greatly facilitate a maintenance programmer’s 
ability to diagnose and fix the problem.  Being focused on what they were trying to 
accomplish, it is often difficult for active users to mentally recreate the sequence of 
events leading up to a problem in sufficient detail to be useful to the maintenance 
programmer. 
 
In addition to the bug and usability reports, the CPSE online report form should make it 
possible for the user to provide commentary, observations and suggestions about any 
tool and re-usable object in the CPSE.  It should also add to the user’s ability to capture, 
quickly and easily, with minimal disruption of their ongoing activities, any suggestions 
that occur to them about new tools or objects needed in the CPSE, about improvements 
that need to be made in existing tools or objects, and about any novel uses for a tool or 
object.  The goal is to have this online report form be so readily accessible that the users 
of the CPSE are in fact able to store annotations, notes to themselves, and, possibly, 
intermediate results of work in progress.  The archive created by these critical incident 
reports would then make it possible to update the CPSE knowledge repository with 
new examples, principles, stories, etc.  Furthermore, this archive could be a critical 
resource in using the CPSE as an environment to maintain, update, or upgrade existing 
works or artifacts that may need to be changed as the world changes.  Finally, given the 
importance in several domains of creative work of keeping a journal or notebook (John-
Steiner, 1997), this functionality could serve the dual purpose of storing the creative 
worker’s thoughts about both the CPSE and about the work being done there.  In 
addition to the possible memory benefits for the creative worker, such a notebook could 
considerably enhance considerably the ability of the technology support people to 
develop an understanding of the creative worker’s needs and goals.  
 
6.1.3  The user benefits of hyper-linkages.   
Special notice needs to be taken of the importance of developing CPSEs with the 
capability for hyper-linkages.  From the perspective of a user of a complex working 
environment, one of the difficulties with which they are faced is keeping track of all that 
they need to know, to remember, and to be able to use efficiently.  The human memory 
works best when there are sufficient environmental cues available in the working 
environment to help serve as reminders and activate important detailed memories in 
long-term storage.  The absence of these environmental cues can create significant 
memory difficulties for the user.  What humans usually store in memory are broad 
general recollections of work and tasks, but not all of the requisite details of 
construction and/or operation of infrequently used tools, etc.  Enabling the CPSE user 
to click on a link and have information brought up without seriously disrupting the 
flow of work can sometimes be all that will be needed to refresh the user’s memory for 
prior use and/or context (Hewett & Adelson, 1998).   
 
In addition to providing appropriate memory aids for the CPSE users, hyper-linkages 
offer other benefits for improving the ability of a domain expert to work more 
efficiently or with less disruption.  When a system is designed from the ground up to 
accommodate the hyper-linkages it is relatively simple to provide for the requirement 
that the CPSE needs to be able to grow and be improved over time through the addition 
of new artifacts and links among locations and artifacts in the working environment.  
Furthermore, with hyper-linkage flexibility built in from the beginning it is also 
relatively easy to have the entire support system take on different characteristics 
depending upon which links are severed or enabled.  For example, selectively turning 
off some of the links in the fully active CPSE support system would make it possible to 
create one or more self-contained training modules on the use of selected tools and/or 
components of the CPSE.  Similarly, selective turning on and off of links makes it 
possible that the artifacts within CPSE can be grouped or re-grouped in various ways to 
create , for example, special purpose tutorials.  Similarly, the CPSE could on one 
occasion be configured to facilitate development of new works and on another to 
facilitate modification of existing products or artifacts. 
 
6.2  Communication support and auto-archiving in CPSEs 
The importance and value of providing adequate communication support for 
individuals working together has created a whole new domain of work in computer 
science and human computer interaction--Computer Supported Collaborative Work 
(CSCW).  The value of communication support, and of auto-archiving of meta-data 
about the support, has been demonstrated in recent work in the realm of engineering 
and manufacturing design.  Regli, his students and his colleagues (e.g., Foster et al. 
2001; Regli & Cicirella, 2000; Hayes  et al. 2000;  Zaychik & Regli, 2003; Sevy et al. 2000; 
Zaychik et al. 2001) have demonstrated both the feasibility and desirability of creating a 
working environment for engineering designers which enables easy, efficient, rapid 
communication between design teams and their members, and of having those 
communications auto-archived.  Once the communications have been adequately 
archived, it is possible to do analyses of the communications to create design meta-data 
which can inform the work of future design engineers seeking solutions to new design 
problems or to addressing the problems of maintaining, updating and/or upgrading 
existing models.   
 
Regli’s work is at least partially motivated by the vision of what he has called a 
Collaborative Design Studio (CDS) in which an enhancement of the design engineering 
process is achieved through integration of computer-aided design (CAD) tools, 
communication tools, and archiving functions.  “Design context is automatically 
extracted from CAD tools for inclusion in communications, and all design related 
communications are automatically archived in a searchable database” (Sevy et al., 2000).  
This archive then provides a repository of design information for other designers to 
examine.  It makes possible the creation of tools that range over the database to extract 
design meta-data.  It also creates a resource that can be utilized by researchers 
interested in the dynamics of work groups and how they do such things as negotiate 
design trade-offs. 
 
Given that many of the basic research questions about the architecture of such a 
working environment for CAD/CAM have been addressed by Regli and his research 
group it is a quite reasonable to envision that a CPSE could be extended and articulated 
to provide the same type of functionalities for any creative work.  Indeed, many 
functionalities investigated by Regli and his group are needed by people working in 
many domains.  For example, it is not unusual for a designer to express the desire to be 
able to look at an object created by another designer and want to be able to recapture 
the reasons why that designer made some of the design choices that are imbedded in an 
existing design.  (Indeed, it is not unheard of for a designer to return to piece of his or 
her own work months or years after completion and want to recapture the reasons why 
certain design choices were made.)  Similarly, it is not unusual for people in the arts, 
architecture, design and many other domains to study the work of others in order to 
understand how certain results were accomplished. 
 
Given the desirability of auto-logging of processes and intermediate results suggested 
above (Hewett & DePaul, 2000) as a generic feature for a working environment to 
support complex work where innovation is desirable, it is a quite natural extension to 
auto-archive all communications taking place between someone working an a CPSE 
and one or more other people.  If both the event log and the communications log are 
searchable, any creative workers who need to recover their own thought processes 
during a given project, will be able to do so from the event log.  For example, by 
examining the communications log associated with other projects a designer or a design 
engineer should be able to determine the design rationale that led to design decisions 
made in the artifacts designed by others.  If those earlier designers are still available, the 
questions asked by others, and the replies, can become part of the history associated 
both with the earlier creative result and with the current ongoing project.  In other 
words, a CPSE should be designed to provide the domain expert with an integrated 
environment containing not only domain specific tools, but also communication tools, 
and multiple archives in the form of searchable databases. 
 
It is also feasible to propose and develop tools which can automate the extraction of 
useful communication meta-data.  For example, Zaychik and Regli (2003) have reported 
on a tool called CodeLink that was designed to capture communication and its context 
in the software project lifecycle.  Zaychik and Regli (2003) begin with the reasonable 
assumption that manual capture of Design Rationale (e.g., documentation of reasons for 
making certain choices rather than others) usually fails because designers and software 
developers do not like interruptions to the flow of their thinking and work.  
Consequently, they designed CodeLink to automatically and unobtrusively extract the 
software development context associated with email-based project communications.  
These emails, along with code snapshots, are then stored in an archive that can be 
searched in a variety of ways.  After describing the CodeLink software architecture they 
discuss a proof of concept implementation and a user study that indicated that the tool 
was performing as intended.  There appears to be no reason in principle why this type 
of meta-data extraction could not become a part of the operation of any CPSE involving 
communication with others. 
  
7.0  Concluding remarks 
To recap the arguments and discussion in this paper, there are reasons to believe that it 
is possible to provide effective support for creative work so long as certain necessary 
conditions exist.  Even though creative products can show substantial differences across 
several domains of human endeavor, there are reasons to believe that there are key 
conditions and processes that are not domain specific and that are associated with 
successful creative work regardless of the domain in which that activity takes place.  
Prominent among these conditions are the ability to create and modify an external 
representation of one or more interim results that can be used in thinking about the 
domain problem and then to rethink and revise the situation if need be.  Similarly, 
analogical thinking seems to be critical to the transfer of ideas between problems and 
domains of creative work.  Also of considerable importance to creative work is the 
ability to work through different aspects of the problem or creative endeavor in order to 
use what one has learned in one or more intermediate steps as a guide for either 
moving forward or for backing up to an earlier place so that a different alternative or 
path can be explored.   In fact, one could make a convincing argument that the ability to 
produce interim results, sometimes in parallel, without having to make a final 
commitment is absolutely essential to creative work (e.g., Lawson, 1993) and that that 
argument applies across a broad range of domains of creative endeavor. 
 
The paper then discussed several user or functional requirements that seem, on the 
basis of considerations of the nature of creative work and The Nature of Insight, to be 
desirable in any working environment intended to support creative problem solving.  
The paper then proposed that fruitful way of thinking about designing creative problem 
solving environments is use the metaphor of the Virtual Workbench.  This metaphor 
has two useful characteristics.  First, the metaphor itself captures or has embedded in it 
several of the user requirements developed from thinking about the nature of creative 
work and insight.  Second, there are empirical reasons to believe it is a workable 
approach. 
 
Although no domain specific creativity support tools have been described in this paper 
the concluding section explores several aspects of what a domain specific CPSE might 
be like by discussing a subset of generic CPSE components.  This discussion illustrates 
characteristics that could be built into these components that would satisfy many of the 
user requirements for capabilities that appear to be generally needed across many 
domains.  Furthermore, the discussion of these components illustrated some of the 
types of relationships that can and should exist between these generic components and 
other more domain specific tools or capabilities. 
 
It is quite possible to take exception to some of the individual arguments and 
interpretations presented above, but it is, nonetheless, the case that there are several 
user requirements for computer-based systems that could be put in place to enable or 
facilitate the capability and possibility for doing creative work.  Most of the ideas 
identified here have been “proven” in that all are based in prior practice and/or solidly 
grounded in Cognitive Science research results.  Probably the most significant major 
weaknesses of this paper are its failure to create an exhaustive list of user requirements 
for creative work and its failure to take account of the differences that exist between 
those people who currently are experts in their domain of creative work and those who 
are much earlier in the development of their expertise.  A CPSE designed to support 
expert performance is not necessarily the best environment for a non-expert to learn or 
develop new knowledge and skills. However, it is reasonable to believe that if the user 
requirements described here were actually in place in a domain specific CPSE, the 
resulting archival resources could be organized or customized so as to suit the needs of 
both experts and non-experts. Novices as well as experts could have access to a whole 
new set of insights into community practice based on being able to recapture such 
things as design history as it actually happened, rather than as it is remembered (or not) 
months or years later.  As Frederick Brooks once observed in a keynote speech at an 
Hypertext Conference, the problem in presenting knowledge in hypertext lies in 
knowing which links to sever (1987).  Design of an information resource which 
accommodates both the needs of experienced and non-experienced users can be 
structured by providing multiple paths through the information resource which include 
clear pathways for the inexperienced and short-cuts and memory aids for the more 
experienced (e.g., Hewett, 1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b).   
 
Several of the features of the generic CPSE envisioned here would help to improve 
personal productivity in creative work, if only through provision of memory aids or 
retrieval cues helpful in recreating prior thinking.  Some of the CPSE’s features would 
provide a simple easy way for the expert to store intermediate results that cue and 
reactivate the thinking that went into creating those intermediate results.   This history 
would enable the person to ramp more quickly back up to speed after significant time 
delays or after intervening work on other projects.  Finally, storage of intermediate 
results, and access to the thinking that led to those results, would facilitate the ability to 
develop and test alternative possibilities under varying sets of constraints without fear 
of loss of context or results.  All of these features would greatly facilitate an individual 
domain expert’s ability to engage in exploration of risky alternatives.  In other words it 
would enable the type of exploratory thinking necessary for insights and creative 
results to occur. 
 
Acknowledgements 
Work on this paper was supported in part by a paid leave funded by Drexel University, 
in part by funding from the Faculty of Information Technology and the Institute for 
Information and Communication Technology at the University of Technology, Sydney, 
which made possible a month as visiting Faculty at the University, and in part by CHI 
Systems, Inc., (where the author was a visiting researcher from Jun of 03 to Aug of 04) 
with support from the Office of Naval Research, under contract  N61339-99-D-
0012/D00010 from the Naval Air Systems Command-Orlando, Training Systems 
Division. 
 
References 
 
Bonnardel, N., 1999. Creativity in design activities: The role of analogy in a constrained 
cognitive environment, in: Candy, L., Edmonds, E. (Eds.), Proc. 3rd Creat. and Cog. 
Conf., ACM Press, New York, pp. 158-165. 
 
Bramley, R., Char, B., Gannon, D., Hewett, T. T., Johnson, C., Rice, J. R., 2000.  
Workshop on scientific knowledge, information, and computing, in: Houstis, E., 
Gallopolous, S., Rice, J. R., Bramley, R. (Eds.), Enabling Technologies for Computational 
Science: Frameworks, Middleware, and Environments, Kluwer, Boston, pp. 19-32. 
 
Brooks, F., 1987. Keynote address. The ACM/IEEE Computer Society Hypertext '87 
Workshop and Conf., 13-15 Nov., Chapel Hill, NC. 
 
Candy, L. & Edmonds, E. A., 1994. Artifacts and the designer’s process: Implications for 
computer support to design.  J. Design Sci. and Tech. 3, 11-31. 
 
Candy, L., & Edmonds, E. A., 1995. Creativity in knowledge work: A process model and 
requirements for support, in: Proc. OZCHI ’95, pp. 242-248 
 
Candy, L. & Edmonds, E. A., 1996. Creative design of the Lotus bicycle: Implications for 
knowledge support systems research. Design Studies, 17, 71-90. 
 
Candy, L. & Edmonds, E. A., 1997. Supporting the creative user: A criteria based 
approach to interaction design.  Design Studies, 18, 185-194 
 Candy, L., O’Brien, S. M., & Edmonds, E. A., 1993. End user manipulation of a 
knowledge based system: A study of an expert’s practice.  Int’l. J. Man-Machine Studies, 
18, 129-145. 
 
Carroll, J. M. & Carrithers, C., 1984.  Training wheels in a user interface.  Commun. 
ACM, 27(8), 800-806. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, M., 1996. Creativity.  Harper-Collins, New York. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. & Sawyer, K., 1995.  Creative insight: The social dimensions of a 
solitary moment, in: Sternberg, R. J., Davidson, J. E. (Eds.), The Nature of Insight. The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 329-364. 
 
 
 
Davidson, J. E., 2003. Insights about insightful problem solving, in: Sternberg, R. J., 
Davidson, J. E. (Eds.), The Psychology of Problem Solving.  Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, pp. 149-175. 
 
Dominowski, R. L. & Dallob, P., 1995.  Insight and problem solving, in: Sternberg, R. J., 
Davidson, J. E. (Eds.), The Nature of Insight. The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 33-61. 
 
Dominowsky, R. L., & Jenrick, R., 1972. Effects of hints and interpolated activity on 
solution of an insight problem.  Psychonom. Sci. 26, 335-338. 
 
Dreyfuss, H., 1955.  Designing for People.  Simon and Schuster, New York. 
 
Dunbar, K., 1995.  How scientists really reason: Scientific reasoning in real-world 
laboratories, in: Sternberg, R. J., Davidson, J. E. (Eds.), The Nature of Insight. The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, pp. 365-396. 
 
Edmonds, E. A. & Candy, L., 1993. Knowledge support for conceptual design: The 
amplification of creativity, in: Proc. HCI Int’l, pp. 350-355. 
 
Edmonds, E. A. & Candy, L., 1996. Computer support for concept engineering design: 
Enabling interaction with design knowledge.  J. Sys. Eng. and Elect. 7 (2), 55-71. 
 
Eindhoven, J. E., & Vinacke, W. E., 1952.  Creative process in painting.  J. Gen. Psych. 47, 
139-164. 
 
Ericsson, K. A., 1996.  The acquisition of expert performance.  In K. A. Ericsson (Ed.) 
The Road to Excellence.  Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, pp. 1-50. 
 
Finke, R. A., 1995.  Creative insight and preinventive forms, in: Sternberg, R. J., 
Davidson, J. E. (Eds.), The Nature of Insight. The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 255-280. 
 
Foster, C., Hayes, E., McWherter, D., Peabody, M., Shapirsteyn, Y., Anthony, L. & Regli, 
W. C., 2001.  Discovering knowledge in design and manufacturing repositories, in: 
Honavar, V. (Ed.) Int’l. Joint Conf. of AI Workshop on Knowledge Disc. from Dist., 
Heterogeneous, Dynamic, Autonomous Data Sources, 40-42. 
 
Gardiner, H., 1993.  Creating Minds.  Basic Books, New York. 
 
Gruber, H. E., 1989.  The evolving systems approach to creative work, in: Wallace, D. B., 
Gruber, H. E.  (Eds.), Creative People at Work.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-
24. 
 Gruber, H. E., 1995.  Insight and affect in the history of science, in: Sternberg, R. J., 
Davidson, J. E. (Eds.), The Nature of Insight. The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 397-432. 
 
Hayes, E. E. & Regli, W. C., 2001. Integrating design process knowledge with CAD 
models, in: ASME Design Eng. Tech. Conferences: Computers and Info. in Eng. 
(DETC2001/CIE-21247), Pittsburgh. 
  
Hewett, T. T., 1987a.  The Drexel Disk: an electronic guidebook, in: Diaper, D. Winder, 
R. (Eds.), People and Computers III.  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 115-
129 
 
Hewett, T. T., 1987b.  The design of an electronic guidebook, in: Proc. ACM/Nat’l 
Bureau of Standards Tech. Symp. on Next Gen. Info. Systems: Tech. for the Future.  
Washington DC Chapter of the ACM, Washington, D. C., pp. 147-153 
 
Hewett, T. T., 1989a. A Gentle Computer Slossary 1.0.  Drexel University, Philadelphia, 
PA.  (An hypertext document with over 350 definitions of computer terms.  Distributed 
by Kinkos Courseware Exchange, 1989-1991, and by Intellimation and W. C. Brown & 
Co., 1991-1992.) 
 
Hewett, T. T., 1989b.  The Drexel Disk: Hypertext based instructional software as a tool 
for the exploration of a constrained knowledge space.  Beh. Res. Meth., Inst. & 
Computers, 21, 316-325. 
 
Hewett, T. T. & Adelson, B., 1998.  Psychological science and analogical reminding in 
the design of artifacts.  Beh. Res. Meth., Inst. & Computers, 30, 314-319. 
 
Hewett, T. T. & DePaul, J. L., 2000.  Toward a human centered scientific problem 
solving environment, in: Houstis, E., Gallopolous, S., Rice, J. R., Bramley, R. (Eds.), 
Enabling Technologies for Computational Science: Frameworks, Middleware, and 
Environments.  Kluwer, Boston, pp. 79-90 
 
Holyoak, K. J. & Thagard, P., 1995. Mental Leaps.  The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
 
Ippolito, M. F. & Tweney, R. D., 1995.  The inception of insight, in: Sternberg, R. J., 
Davidson, J. E. (Eds.), The Nature of Insight. The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 433-462. 
 
Isaak, M. I. & Just, M. A., 1995.  Constraints on thinking in insight and invention, in: 
Sternberg, R. J., Davidson, J. E. (Eds.), The Nature of Insight. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
pp. 281-326. 
 
Johnson, J. , Lakshman, Y. N., Hewett, T. T., Souder, T. , Donegan, S., Fitzgerald, T., & 
Morgovsky, P., 1998. Virtual office hours using TechTalk, a web-based mathematical 
collaboration tool, in: Proc. 3rd Ann. Conf. on Integrating Tech. into Comp. Sci. Ed.  
ACM Press, New York, pp. 130-133. 
 
John-Steiner, V., 1997.  Notebooks of the Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Jung-Beeman, M., Bowden, E. M., Haberman, J., Frymiare, J., Arambel-Liu, S., 
Greenblatt, R., Reber, P. J., & Kounious, J., 2004.  Neural activity when people solve 
verbal problems with insight. PLOS Biology, 2, 4, 
(http://www.plosbiology.org/plosonline/?request=get-
document&doi=10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097), accessed 5 July, 2004 
 
Lawson, B. R., 1993).  Parallel lines of thought.  Languages of Design, 1(4), 357-366. 
 
McWherter, D., Zaychik, V., Hayes, E. E., Regli, W. C., & Sevy, J., 2000.  Software 
architecture to facilitate automated message recording and context annotation, in: Proc. 
Int’l Society for Optical Eng., Network Intell: Internet Based Manufacturing, vol. 4208, 
Boston. 
 
Mardall, C., 1968. Architecture, in: Kallas, H., Nickels, S. (Eds.),  FINLAND Creation 
and Construction.  Praeger, New York. 
 
Mayer, R. E., 1995.  The search for insight: Grappling with Gestalt Psychology’s 
unanswered questions, in: Sternberg, R. J., Davidson, J. E. (Eds.), The Nature of Insight. 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 3-32. 
 
Meadow, C. T., Hewett, T. T. & Aversa, E. A., 1982a.  A computer intermediary for 
interactive database searching: Part I: Design.  J. Am. Soc. for Info. Sci. 33, 357-364. 
 
Meadow, C. T., Hewett, T. T. & Aversa, E. A., 1982b.  A computer intermediary for 
interactive database searching: Part II: Evaluation.  J. Am. Soc. for Info. Sci. 33, 357-364. 
 
Metcalfe, J., 1986a. Feeling of knowing in memory and problem solving.  J. Exp. Psych.: 
Learn., Mem., and Cog. 12, 288-294. 
 
Metcalfe, J., 1986b. Premonitions of insight predict impending error.  J. Exp. Psych.: 
Learn., Mem., and Cog. 12, 623-634. 
 
Metcalfe, J., & Weibe, D., 1987.  Metacognition in insight and noninsight problem 
solving.   Mem. and Cog. 15, 238-246. 
 
Miller, A. I., 2000. Insights of Genius.  Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Nickerson, R. S., 1999. Enhancing creativity, in: Sternberg, R. J. (Ed.) Handbook of 
Creativity.  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Ohlton, R. M., 1979.  Experimental studies of incubation: Searching for the elusive.  J. 
Creat. Beh. 13, 9-22. 
 
Ohlton, R. M., & Johnson, D. M., 1976.  Mechanisms of incubation in creative problem 
solving.  Am. J. Psych. 89, 617-630. 
 
Patrick, C., 1937. Creative thought in artists. J. Psych. 4, 35-73.  
 
Petroski, H., 1996a.  Engineers of Dreams.  Vintage Books, New York. 
 
Petroski, H., 1996b. Invention by Design.  Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Regli, W. C. & Cicirella, V. A., 2000.  Managing digital libraries for computer-aided 
design.  J. Comp. Aided Design, 33, 2, 119-132. 
 
Robbins, E., 1997. Why Architects Draw.  The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
 
Rowe, P. G., 1987.  Design Thinking.  The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
 
Sevy, J., Zaychik, V., Hewett, T. T., & Regli, W. C., 2000.  Developing and evaluating 
collaborative engineering studios, in: IEEE 8th Int’l Workshop on Enabling 
Technologies: Infrastructure for Collab Enterprises Workshop on Eval. of Collab. 
Enterprises.  Gaithersburg, MD, 118-124. 
 
Shekerjian, D., 1990. Uncommon Genius.  Penguin Books, New York. 
 
Shneiderman, B., 1999. User interfaces for creativity support tools, in: Candy, L., 
Edmonds, E. (Eds.), Proc. 3rd Creat. and Cog. Conf.  pp. 15-21. 
 
Shneiderman, B., 2000. Creating creativity: User interfaces for supporting innovation.  
ACM Trans. on Comp.-Hum. Interaction.  7, 1 (Mar.), 114-138 
 
Smith, S. M., 1995.  Getting into and out of mental ruts: A theory of fixation, incubation, 
and insight, in: Sternberg, R. J., Davidson, J. E. (Eds.), The Nature of Insight.  MIT Press, 
Cambridge, pp. 229-251. 
 
Smith, S. M., & Blankenship, S. E., 1991.  Incubation effects.  Bull. Psychonom. Soc. 27, 
311-314. 
 
Smith, S. M., Ward, T.  B., & Finke, R. A., 1994.  The Creative Cognition Approach.  The 
MIT Press, Cambridge. 
 
Sternberg, R. J. & Davidson, J. E., 1995.  The Nature of Insight.  The MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
Wallace, D. B.  & Gruber, H. E., 1989.  Creative People at Work.  Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 
Wallas, G., 1926).  The Art of Thought.  J. Cape, London. 
 
Weisberg, R. W., 1986.  Creativity: Genius and Other Myths.  W. H. Freeman, New 
York. 
 
Weisberg, R. W., 1993. Creativity: Beyond the Myth of Genius.  W. H. Freeman, New 
York. 
 Zaychik, V. & Regli, W. C., 2003. Capturing communication and context in the software 
project lifecycle.  Res. in Eng. Design, 14, 75-88. 
 
Zaychik, V., Sevy, J., Hewett, T. T., & Regli, W. C., 2001. Issues in building and 
evaluating networked engineering environments, in: Cugini, U., Wozny, M. (Eds.), 4th 
IFIP WG 5.2 Workshop in Knowledge Intensive CAD, Parma, Italy. 
